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Abstract Motivated by applications to word-of-mouth advertising, we consider a game-theoretic sce-
nario in which competing advertisers want to target initial adopters in a social network. Each advertiser
wishes to maximize the resulting cascade of influence, modeled by a general network diffusion process.
However, competition between products may adversely impact the rate of adoption for any given firm.
The resulting framework gives rise to complex preferences that depend on the specifics of the stochastic
diffusion model and the network topology.
We study this model from the perspective of a central mechanism, such as a social networking
platform, that can optimize seed placement as a service for the advertisers. We ask: given the reported
demands of the competing firms, how should a mechanism choose seeds to maximize overall efficiency?
Beyond the algorithmic problem, competition raises issues of strategic behaviour: rational agents should
not be incentivized to underreport their budget demands.
We show that when there are two players, the social welfare can be 2-approximated by a polynomial-
time strategyproof mechanism. Our mechanism is defined recursively, randomizing the order in which
advertisers are allocated seeds according to a particular greedy method. For three or more players, we
demonstrate that under additional assumptions (satisfied by many existing models of influence spread)
there exists a simpler strategyproof e
e−1 -approximation mechanism; notably, this second mechanism is
not necessarily strategyproof when there are only two players.
Keywords. Game Theory, social networks, mechanism design, influence diffusion
1 Introduction
The concept of word-of-mouth advertising is built upon the idea that referrals between individuals can
lead to a contagion of opinion in a population. In this way, a small number of initial adopters can generate
a cascade of influence, significantly impacting the adoption of a new product. While this concept has
been very well studied in the marketing and sociology literature [1,2,3,4,5], recent popularity of online
social networking has made it possible to obtain rich data and directly target individuals based on
network topology. Indeed, a potential advantage of advertising served via online social networks is that
the platform could preferentially target central individuals, impacting the overall effectiveness of its
advertisers’ campaigns.
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Various models of network influence spread have arisen recently in the literature, with a focus on the
algorithmic problem of deciding which individuals to target as initial adopters (or “seeds”) [6,7,8]. One
commonality among many of these (stochastic) models is that the expected number of eventual adopters
is a non-decreasing submodular function of the seed set. This implies that natural greedy methods [9]
can be used to choose initial adopters to approximately maximize an advertiser’s expected influence.
Of course, actually applying such algorithms requires intimate knowledge of the social network, which
may not be readily available to all advertisers. However, the owners of the network data (e.g. Facebook
or Google) could more easily find potentially influential individuals to target. Our goal is to study the
problem faced by a network platform who wishes to provide this service to its advertisers.
Consider the following framework. An online social network platform sells advertising space by con-
tract, offering a price per impression to advertising firms. Each firm has an advertising budget, which
determines a number of ad impressions they wish to display. As an additional service to the firms, the
platform attempts to optimize the placement of advertisements so to maximize influence diffusion. This
optimization is to be provided as a service to the advertisers, with the primary goal of making the social
network more attractive as a marketing platform. The network provider thus faces an algorithmic prob-
lem: maximize the total influence of the advertisers given their demands (i.e. number of impressions).
This problem may be complicated by competition between advertisers, which results in negative exter-
nalities upon each others’ product adoptions. Moreover, since advertising budgets are private, there is
also a game-theoretic component to the problem: the placement algorithm should not incentivize firms to
reduce their budgets. This may happen if, due to eccentricities of the algorithm, lower-budget advertisers
might obtain higher expected influence than advertisers with higher budgets.
Crucial to this problem formulation is the way in which influence is modeled by the advertising plat-
form. We present a general submodular assignment problem with negative externalities, which captures
most previous influence models that have been proposed in the literature [10,11,12,13]. Within this
framework, we consider the optimization problem faced by a central mechanism that must determine the
seed nodes for each advertiser, given the advertisers’ budget constraints. The goal of the mechanism is
to maximize the overall efficiency of the marketing campaigns, but the advertisers are strategic and may
underreport their budget demands to increase their own product adoption rates.
Two points of clarification are in order. First, our formulation differs from a line of prior work that
studies equilibria of the game in which each advertiser selects their seed set directly [13,11]. Such a
game supposes that each advertiser has detailed knowledge of the social network topology, the ability
to compute or converge to equilibrium strategies, and the power to target arbitrary individuals in the
network. Our work differs in that we assume that the targeted advertising goes through an intermediary
(the social network), which selects seed sets on the players’ behalf.
Second, we suppose that advertiser budgets and the price per impression are set exogenously (or,
alternatively, that the seeds correspond to special offers or other interventions of limited quantity). As
such, we do not explicitly model the problem of maximizing revenue; rather, the role of our mechanism
is to decide where to place the purchased impressions. In this sense our framework is closer in spirit to
matching algorithms for display advertising [14,15] than to revenue-optimal mechanism design. There are
many ways in which this model could be enriched, such as by endogenizing budgets or allowing complex
pricing schemes that depend upon expected influence. We leave these as avenues for future work, though
we note that such extensions presuppose that agents have sufficient knowledge of the spread process and
graph topology to accurately value initial adoption sets.
Our model of competitive influence spread is described formally in Section 2. Our formulation cap-
tures and extends many existing models of influence spread, allowing incorporation of features such as
node weights, player-specific spread probabilities, and non-linear selection probabilities. A more detailed
discussion appears in Appendix A.
We wish to design mechanisms that are strategyproof, in that rational agents are incentivized to
truthfully reveal their demands. In particular, an agent should not be able to increase its expected
influence by reducing its requested number of seeds (i.e. budget). The difficulty in avoiding such non-
monotonicities is that the expected outcome of an advertiser can be negatively impacted by externalities
imposed by the allocation to its opponents, which can depend on the budget declarations in a non-trivial
manner.
Our Results: We design three different strategyproof mechanisms for the competitive influence max-
imization problem, for use in varying circumstances. Our main result is a 2-approximate strategyproof
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mechanism for use when there are two competing advertisers, under a very general model of influence
spread. This mechanism uses a novel technique for monotonizing the expected utilities of the agents
using geometric properties of the problem in the two-player case.
Our construction is based upon a greedy algorithm for submodular function maximization subject to
a partition matroid constraint, known as the locally greedy algorithm [9,16]. This algorithm repeatedly
chooses an agent in each round, and assigns a node to that agent in order to maximize the marginal
increase to social welfare. As we discuss in Section 3, this algorithm is not strategyproof in general.
However, it has the property that the choice of agent in each round is arbitrary; this provides a degree
of freedom that can be exploited to obtain strategyproofness. Indeed, for the case of two agents, we
show how to recursively construct a distribution over potential allocations returned by locally greedy
algorithms, with the property that each agent’s expected individual value under this distribution is
monotone1 with respect to the number of initial elements allocated.
Our second mechanism is for three or more players, under some natural restrictions on the influence
spread process. Specifically, we require two properties: first, the social welfare is independent of the
manner in which elements are partitioned among the players (mechanism indifference). Second, the
payoff of a player does not depend on the manner in which the elements allocated to her competitors
are partitioned among the competitors (agent indifference). These conditions are defined formally in
Section 5. We note that these assumptions are implicit in many prior models of influence spread [10,
11]. Under these assumptions, we develop a strategyproof mechanism that obtains a e
e−1 -approximation
to the optimal social welfare when there are three or more players. Interestingly, our analysis makes
crucial use of the presence of three or more players, and indeed we show that this mechanism fails to be
strategyproof when only two players are present, even with these two additional assumptions2.
Our final mechanism construction satisfies an additional constraint that agent allocations be disjoint.
In its most general form, our problem specification does not require that the set of elements allocated to
the agents be disjoint3. Our first mechanism described above may place a given node in the seed sets of
multiple players. Our second mechanism for more than two players produces a disjoint allocation when
the greedy algorithm used for a single player results in a disjoint allocation. When it is desirable for
allocations to be disjoint, we show how our construction can be modified to work under this additional
requirement, resulting in a strategyproof 3-approximationmechanism. This result requires that we impose
a symmetry assumption on the influence spread model, which states that the outcome of the influence
process is invariant under relabelling of the players4.
Our mechanisms run in time polynomial in the demands submitted by the agents and in the size
of the underlying ground set. This dependence on the demand values is necessary, as the mechanism
constructs a solution consisting of sets of this size. Our dependence on the size of the underlying ground
set is captured by queries for an element that maximizes a marginal increase in social welfare. Given
oracle access to queries of this nature, our algorithm would run in time polynomial in the declared
demands. Generally speaking, the spread process itself is randomized and as in [6,7], the oracle can be
viewed as providing an element that approximately maximizes the marginal gain by sampling enough
trials of this process [6,7]. Our analysis also holds when such approximate marginal maximizers are used
to implement our underlying greedy algorithm; following the exposition in [16], such an approximate
maximizer provides an approximation that approaches 2 as the oracle approximation approaches 1. We
will simplify our discussion throughout by assuming it is possible to find elements that exactly maximize
marginal gains in social welfare.
Related Work: Models of influence spread in networks, covering both cascade and threshold phenom-
ena, are well-studied in the sociology and marketing literature [1,2]. The (non-competitive) problem of
maximizing influence in social networks was theoretically modelled by Kempe et al. [6,7]. Subsequent
papers extended these models to a competitive setting in which there are multiple advertisers. Carnes et
al. [10] suggested the Wave Propagation model and the Distance Based model, which were based on the
1 We use the word monotone in its game-theoretic sense, meaning that a player’s outcome is a monotone function of
its bid. We distinguish this from the monotonicity of the social welfare function of the mechanism, and use the term
non-decreasing when referring to the social welfare function.
2 Notice that the agent indifference property holds vacuously in the two-player case, as there is only one other player.
3 Many prior models of competitive influence do allow non-disjoint allocations [13,11]; our intention is to demonstrate
that a disjointness condition can be accommodated if necessary, rather than imply that non-disjointness is undesirable.
4 We note that this property holds for most models of influence spread studied in the literature [13,11,10,17].
3
Independent Cascade model. Additionally, Dubey et al. [18], Bharathi et al. [11], Kosta et al. [19], and
Apt et al. [17] also studied various competitive models. The main issue that these models addressed was
how to arbitrate ties in each step of the process, determining which technology a node will assume when
reached by several technologies at once. The main algorithmic task addressed by these models is choosing
the optimal set of nodes for a player entering an existing market, in which the competitor’s choice of
initial nodes is already known. Borodin et al. [12] presented the OR model which proposes a different
approach, in which the previously studied, non-competitive diffusion models proceed independently for
each technology as a first phase of the process, after which the nodes decide between each technology
according to some decision function.
Independent of our work [20], Goyal and Kearns [13] provided bounds on the efficiency of equilibria
(i.e. the price of anarchy) in a competitive influence game played by two players. Their influence spread
model is characterized by switching functions (specifying the process by which a node decides to adopt a
product) and selection functions (specifying the manner in which nodes decide which product to adopt).
They demonstrate that an equilibrium of the resulting game yields half of the optimal social welfare,
given that the switching functions are concave. Their model is closely related to our own. Specifically, the
social welfare function is monotone and satisfies the mechanism indifference assumption, and concavity
of the switching function implies that the social welfare is submodular (by [8]), so our mechanism for
two players applies to their model as well5. Goyal and Kearns also note that their results extend to
k > 2 players, resulting in an approximation factor of 2k, when the selection function is linear; this
linearity implies our agent indifference assumption, and hence our mechanism for three or more players
also applies. However, we note that the Goyal and Kearns results on efficiency at equilibrium are satisfied
without an intervening mechanism and hence are incomparable with the mechanism results of this paper.
Finally, to the best of our knowledge, there is only one other paper that considers a mechanism design
problem in the context of competitive influence spread. Namely, Singer [21] considers a social network
where the nodes are viewed as agents who have private costs for hosting a product and the mechanism
has a budget for inducing some set of initial nodes to become hosts. The mechanism wishes to maximize
the number of nodes that will eventually be influenced and each agent wishes to maximize their profit
equal to the inducement received minus its private cost.
2 Preliminaries
We consider a setting in which there is a ground set U = {e1, . . . , en} of n elements (e.g. nodes in a
social network), and k players. An allocation is some (S1, . . . , Sk) ∈ 2U × · · ·× 2U ; that is, an assignment
of set6 Si to each player i. For the most part we will follow the convention that these sets should be
disjoint, though in general our model does not require disjointness. In particular, we consider a setting
in which sets need not be disjoint in Section 4.
We are given functions fi : 2
U × · · · 2U → R≥0, denoting the expected values of players i = 1, . . . , k,
for allocation (S1, . . . , Sk). We define f =
∑k
i=1 fi, so that f(S) = f(Si,S−i) denotes the total expected
welfare of the allocation (S) = (S1, . . . , Sk) = (Si,S−i).
We will require that functions f , and f1, . . . , fk satisfy certain properties, motivated by known
properties of influence spread models studied in the literature. First, we will assume that f is a sub-
modular non-decreasing function, in the following sense. For any Si ⊆ S′i, S−i, and e ∈ U , we have
f(Si,S−i) ≤ f(S
′
i,S−i) and
f(Si ∪ {e},S−i)− f(Si,S−i) ≥ f(S
′
i ∪ {e},S−i)− f(S
′
i,S−i).
We will also require that for all i = 1, . . . , k, the function fi be non-decreasing in the allocation to player
i, so that fi(Si,S−i) ≤ fi(S′i,S−i) for any Si ⊆ S
′
i.
We impose one final model assumption, which we call adverse competition: that each fi is non-
increasing in the allocation to other players. That is, for all j 6= i, fi(Sj ,S−j) ≥ fi(S
′
j ,S−j) for any
Sj ⊆ S′j . This assumption captures our intuition that, in a competitive influence model, the presence of
5 An “adverse competition” assumption in [13] is stated for k = 2 agents and holds at every node. Their assumption is
somewhat weaker than ours, which we only apply to the social welfare function. See section 2.
6 For notational convenience we will assume that S1, . . . , Sk are sets, but our results extend to permit multisets (i.e.,
where the same element can be awarded multiple times to one agent). See Appendix A for further discussion.
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additional adopters for one player can only impede the spread of influence for another player. We discuss
the motivation for and necessity of this assumption in Appendix A.
We study the following algorithmic problem. Given input values b1, . . . , bk ≥ 0, we wish to find sets
S1, . . . , Sk ⊆ U , with |Si| = bi, for all i = 1, . . . , k, such that f(S1, . . . , Sk) is maximized. We assume we
are given oracle access to the functions f and f1, . . . , fk. Note that we impose a “demand satisfaction”
condition on the mechanism, that each agent is allocated all of his demand. (To this end we will assume
that |U | ≥
∑k
i=1 bi; i.e. that there are enough items to allocate).
Suppose that A is a deterministic algorithm for the above problem, so that A(b1, . . . , bk) denotes an
allocation for any b1, . . . , bk ≥ 0. We say that A is monotone if, for all bid vectors b = (b1, . . . , bk) ∈ Zk≥0,
fi(A(bi,b−i)) ≤ fi(A(bi +1,b−i)), for each player i = 1, . . . , k. We extend this definition to randomized
algorithms in the natural way, by taking expectations over the outcomes returned by A.
We will assume that each player i has a type b˜i, representing the maximum number of elements they
can be allocated. The utility of player i for allocation S = (S1, . . . , Sk) is
ui(S) =
{
fi(Si,S−i) if |Si| ≤ b˜i
−∞ otherwise.
We then say that algorithm A is strategyproof if, for all b ∈ Zk≥0 and b
′
i ≤ bi, ui(A(b
′
i,b−i)) ≤
ui(A(bi,b−i)). In other words, an algorithm is strategyproof if it incentivizes each agent to report its
type truthfully.
The problem of maximizing welfare function f(·) subject to the reported demands can be stated in
the framework of maximizing a submodular set-function subject to a partition matroid constraint. An
instance of a partition matroidM = (E,F) is given by a union of disjoint sets E =
⋃
i=1,...,k Ei, and a set
of corresponding cardinality constraints d1, . . . , dk. A set X is in F , i.e. is independent, if |X ∩Ei| ≤ di,
for all 1 ≤ i ≤ k. That is, an independent set is formed by taking no more than the prescribed size
constraint for each of the sets. The optimization problem to find an independent set that maximizes a
non-decreasing and submodular set-function g : F → R≥0. Our problem falls into this framework by
setting the ground set to be U × {1, . . . , k}, the cardinality constraints di = bi, for all i and setting the
objective function to be the social welfare:
g(X) = f(S), where X =
k⋃
i=1
(Si × {i}). (1)
We note, however, that this formulation does not apply if the allocated sets are required to be disjoint.
The addition of disjointness causes our constraint to no longer take the form of a matroid, an issue which
will be addressed in Section 6. Also note that this alternative definition of our setting conforms to the
single-parameter convention of submodular set-functions. However, we will mostly refer to the former
formulation of the problem for clarity and succinctness.
As a result of this correspondence with the framework of partition matroids, we will be interested
in a particular greedy algorithm for this algorithmic problem, known as a locally greedy algorithm,
studied in [22], which was subsequently extended in [16]. The algorithm proceeds by fixing some arbitrary
permutation of the multiset composed of bi i’s for each player i. It then iteratively builds the allocation S
where, on iteration j, it chooses u ∈ argmaxc{f(Si ∪{c},S−i)− f(Si,S−i)} and adds u to Si, where i is
the jth element of the permutation. Regardless of the permutation selected, this algorithm is guaranteed
to obtain a 2-approximation to the optimal allocation subject to the given cardinality constraints [22,
16].
3 Counter examples when there are two agents
The locally greedy algorithm [9] (see also [16]) is defined over an arbitrary permutation of the agents
allocation turns. In Section 4 we carefully construct such orderings in a manner that induces strate-
gyproofness for two players. To motivate these algorithmic gymnastics, we now demonstrate that more
natural orderings fail to result in strategyproofness.
We begin by considering the “dictatorship” ordering, in which one player is first allocated nodes up
to his budget, and only then is the other player allocated nodes. We will refer to the agents as A and
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B, and their utilities as fA and fB respectively; suppose that A is the dictator. For the purposes of our
example we will describe fA and fB in terms of the following concrete (but simple) competitive influence
spread process7 on an undirected network G = (V,E).
Suppose that each agent is given an initial seed set, say SA and SB. For agent A, each node in SA
is given a single chance to activate each of its neighbors independently, which it does with probability
p = 0.9. (Note that this activation process is not recursive; it affects only the neighbors of SA). We then,
independently, allow each node in seed set SB to attempt to activate each of its neighbors, resulting in
a set of nodes activated by B. To determine the final influence sets, any node activated only by A is
influenced by A, any activated only by B is influenced by B, and any node activated by both will choose
between the two agents uniformly at random. The value of fA(SA, SB) is the expected number of nodes
influenced by A at the end of this process, and similarly for fB. One can easily show that an agent’s
influence is non-decreasing in its seed set, that the sum of influences is submodular non-decreasing, and
that the functions satisfy adverse competition.
Our network is as follows. The graph consists of two components; one is the complete bipartite graph
K2,10, and the other is the star K1,4. Let w1 and w2 be the two nodes of degree 10, and let v be the
center of the star. We claim that the locally greedy algorithm paired with the dictatorship ordering is not
strategyproof for this network. Suppose each agent declares a budget of 1; in this case, the algorithm will
allocate w1 to agent A, then it will allocate v to agent B (since 4p > 10(1− (1− p)
2)− 10p, which means
that v maximizes the marginal gain in social welfare). This results in an expected influence of 10p = 9
for agent A. In the case where A has a budget of 2 (and B’s budget is still 1), the greedy algorithm will
allocate w1 and v to agent A (for the same reason as before), and will give w2 to agent B. In this case,
the influence of agent A becomes 4p+10(p · (1− p)+ p
2
2 ) = 8.55 < 9, so in particular his influence is not
non-decreasing in his declaration.
The above construction can be modified to show that various other orderings for the locally greedy
algorithm fail to result in strategyproof mechanisms. Appendix B provides the following examples:
1. The Round Robin ordering: the mechanism alternates between the players when allocating a node.
2. Always choosing the player having the smallest current unsatisfied budget breaking ties in favor of
player A.
3. Taking a uniformly random choice over all orderings with the required number of allocations to A
and B.
The last example is particularly relevant, since in Section 5 we show that for the case of k > 2 agents, in a
setting that assumes two additional restrictions called MeI and AgI (which will be defined in Section 5),
taking a uniformly random permutation over the allocation turns is a strategyproof algorithm and results
in an e
e−1 approximation to the optimal social welfare. In contrast, for the case of k = 2, and even with
these additional restrictions (one can verify that the influence model described above, used for our
counterexample, does satisfy both MeI and AgI, although the AgI condition is vacuous), the uniformly
random mechanism is not strategyproof.
4 A Strategyproof Mechanism for Two Players
In this section we describe our mechanism for allocating nodes when there are two agents. The case of
k > 2 agents is handled in Section 5, under additional assumptions that are not necessary for the case
k = 2. Our mechanism is based on the local greedy algorithm described in Section 2. We will focus on
cases in which the allocations to the two agents need not be disjoint; in Section 6 we extend our result
to handle disjointness constraints when agents are “anonymous.”
A nice property of the local greedy algorithm is that its worst-case approximation factor of 2 holds
even if we arbitrarily fix the order in which allocations are made to players A and B. This grants a
degree of freedom that we will use to satisfy strategyproofness. Given a particular pair of budgets (a, b),
we will randomize over possible orderings in which to allocate to the two agents, and then apply the
greedy algorithm to whichever permutation we choose. The key to the algorithm will be the manner in
which we choose the distribution to randomize over, which will depend on the declared budgets and the
influence functions fi. As it turns out, some of the more immediate ways of selecting an ordering lead
7 This process is a simplification of the OR model [12].
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to non-strategyproof mechanisms. See Appendix 3 for a survey of na¨ıve orderings. Indeed, it is not even
clear a priori that distributions exist that simultaneously monotonize the expected allocation for both
players. Our main technical contribution is a proof that such distributions do exist, and moreover can
be explicitly constructed in polynomial time.
The idea behind our construction, at a high level, is as follows. We will construct the distribution for
use with budgets (a, b) recursively. Writing t = a + b, we first generate distributions for the case t = 1
(which are trivial), followed by t = 2, etc. To construct the distribution for demands (a, b), we consider
the following thought experiment. We will choose an ordering in one of two ways. Either we choose a
permutation according to the distribution for budget pair (a − 1, b) and then append a final allocation
to A, or else choose a permutation according to the distribution for budget pair (a, b − 1) and append
an allocation to player B. If we choose the former option with some probability α, and the latter with
probability 1− α, this defines a probability distribution for budget pair (a, b).
What we will show is that, assuming our distributions are constructed to adhere to certain invariants,
we can choose this α such that the resulting randomized algorithm (i.e. the greedy algorithm applied
to permutations drawn from the constructed distributions) will be monotone. That is, the expected
influence of player A under the distribution for (a, b) is at least that of the distribution for (a− 1, b), and
similarly for player B. The existence of such an α is not guaranteed in general; we will need to prove that
our constructed distributions satisfy an additional “cross-monotonicity” property in order to guarantee
that such an α exists.
One problem with the above technique is that it does not bound the size of the support of the
distributions. In general there will be exponentially many possible permutations to randomize over,
leading to exponential computational complexity to compute each α. One might attempt to overcome
such issues by sampling to estimate the required probabilities, but this introduces the possibility of
non-monotonicities due to sampling error, which we would like to avoid. We demonstrate that each
distribution we construct can be “pruned” so that its support contains at most three permutations,
while still retaining its monotonicity properties. In this way, we guarantee that our recursive process
requires only polynomially many queries (to the influence functions) in order to choose a permutation.
4.1 The Allocation Algorithm
Our algorithm will proceed by choosing a distribution over orders in which nodes are allocated to the
two players. This will be stored in a matrix M , where M [a, b] contains a distribution over sequences
(y1, . . . , yt) ∈ {A,B}a+b, containing a ‘A’s and b ‘B’s. We then choose a sequence from distribution
M [a, b] and greedily construct a final allocation with respect to that ordering. We begin by describing
the manner in which the allocation is made, given the distribution over orderings. The algorithm is given
as Algorithm 1. An important property of the allocation algorithm that we will require for our analysis
Algorithm 1: Allocation Mechanism
Input: Ground set U = {e1, . . . , . . . , en}, budgets a, b for players A and B, respectively
Output: An allocation IA, IB ⊆ U for the two players
/* Build permutation table. */
1 M ← ConstructDistributions(a, b) ;
/* M [a, b] will be a distribution over sequences (y1, . . . , ya+b) ∈ {A,B}
a+b */
2 Choose (y1, . . . , ya+b) from distribution M [a, b];
3 for i = 1 . . . a + b do
4 if yi =
′ A′ then
5 u← argmaxc∈U{f(IA ∪ {c}, IB)− f(IA, IB)} ;
6 IA ← IA ∪ {u} ;
7 else
8 u← argmaxc∈U{f(IA, IB ∪ {c})− f(IA, IB)} ;
9 IB ← IB ∪ {u} ;
10 end
11 end
is that, given a sequence drawn from distribution M [a, b], the allocation is chosen myopically. That is,
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items are chosen for the players in the order dictated by the given sequence, independent of subsequent
allocations. We will use this property to construct the distribution M [a, b], which will be tailored to
the specific algorithm to ensure strategyproofness. We note that this technique could be applied to any
allocation algorithm with this property; we will make use of this observation in Section 6.
Recall that the approximation guarantee for the greedy allocation does not depend on the order
of assignment implemented in lines 3-11, so that the allocation returned by the algorithm will be a 2-
approximation to the optimal total influence regardless of the permutation chosen on line 2. It remains
only to demonstrate that we can construct our distributions in such a way that the expected payoff to
each player is monotone increasing in his bid.
4.2 Constructing matrix M
We describe the procedure ConstructDistributions, used in Algorithm 1, to generate distributions over
orderings of assignments to playersA and B. We will build tableM [·, ·] recursively, whereM [a, b] describes
the distribution corresponding to budgets a and b. Our procedure will terminate when the required entry
has been constructed.
We think of M [a, b] as a distribution over sequences of the form (y1, . . . , ya+b), where yi ∈ {A,B}.
For any given sequence, the corresponding allocation is determined since the greedy algorithm applied
in Algorithm 1 is deterministic. We can therefore also think of M [a, b] as a distribution over allocations,
and in what follows we will refer to “allocations drawn from M [a, b]” without further comment.
Note that M [0, b] must assign probability 1 to the sequence (B,B, . . . , B), and similarly M [a, 0]
assigns probability 1 to (A,A, . . . , A). We will construct the remaining entries of the table M [a, b] in
increasing order of a+ b.
Before describing the recursive procedure for filling the table, we provide some notation. Given M ,
we will write wA(a, b) for the expected value of agent A under the distribution of allocations returned
by M [a, b]. Similarly, wB(a, b) will be the expected value of agent B, and w(a, b) = wA(a, b) + wB(a, b)
is the expected total welfare. For notational convenience, set wA(a, b) = wB(a, b) = 0 if a < 0 or b < 0.
We will construct M so that the following invariants hold for all a > 0 and b > 0:
1. wA(a, b) ≥ wA(a− 1, b).
2. wB(a, b) ≥ wB(a, b− 1).
3. wA(a, b) ≥ wA(a− 1, b+ 1).
4. wB(a, b) ≥ wB(a+ 1, b− 1).
5. The support of M [a, b] contains at most 3 sequences.
The first two desiderata capture the monotonicity properties we require of our algorithm. Note that if M
satisfies these properties, then Algorithm 1 will be monotone and hence strategyproof. The subsequent
two invariants are cross-monotonicity properties, which will help us in the iterative construction of
further entries ofM . The final property limits the complexity of constructing and sampling fromM [a, b],
implying that Algorithm 1 runs in polynomial time.
We now describe the way in which we construct distribution M [a, b], given distributions M [a′, b′] for
all a′ + b′ < a + b. We consider two distributions: the first selects a sequence according to M [a − 1, b]
and appends an ’A’, and the second selects a sequence according to M [a, b− 1] and appends a ’B’. Call
these two distributions D1 and D2, respectively. What we would like to do is find some α, 0 ≤ α ≤ 1,
such that if we choose from distribution D1 with probability α and distribution D2 with probability
1 − α, then the resulting combined distribution (for M [a, b]) will satisfy wA(a, b) ≥ wA(a − 1, b) and
wB(a, b) ≥ wB(a, b− 1). Of course, this combined distribution may have support of size up to 6 (3 from
D1 and 3 from D2) but we will show that it can be pruned to a distribution with the same expected
influence for agents A and B, with at most 3 permutations in its support.
Our main technical result, Theorem 1, demonstrates that an appropriate value of α, as described in
the process sketched above, is guaranteed to exist and can be found efficiently.
Theorem 1 It is possible to construct table M in such a way that the following properties hold for all
a+ b ≥ 1:
1. wA(a, b) ≥ wA(a− 1, b)
2. wB(a, b) ≥ wB(a, b− 1).
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3. wA(a, b) ≥ wA(a− 1, b+ 1)
4. wB(a, b) ≥ wB(a+ 1, b− 1).
Furthermore, the entries of M can be computed in polynomial time.
Proof We will proceed by induction on t = a+ b. The result is trivial for t = 1, so consider t > 1.
Our proof will be geometric. We will associate with each entry ofM , sayM [a, b], the point (wA(a, b), wB(a, b))
in R2. Our approach will be to use the entries of M with total budget less than t to construct a certain
convex region of potential points for each M [a, b] with a+ b = t. We will then argue that there is a way
to select a point from each convex region satisfying the four required properties.
We introduce some helpful notation. For a point p ∈ R2, we let pA = p(1) denote the first coordinate
of p, whereas the second coordinate of p will be given by pB = p(2). Note that if p is the point associated
with M [a, b], then pA = w
A(a, b). Given a pair of points p, q ∈ R2, we will write [p, q] for the line segment
with endpoints p and q. Lastly, for two points p, p′ ∈ R2, we say that p ≤ p′ if pA ≤ p
′
A and pB ≤ p
′
B.
The following simple geometric claim will be instrumental to our proof:
Claim 1 Let (L(1), . . . , L(t)) be a sequence of line segments in R2, with L(i) = [p(i), q(i)]. Suppose further
that p(i) ≤ q(j) for all i < j. Then there is a sequence of points (r(1), . . . , r(t)), with r(i) ∈ L(i), such that
r(i) ≤ r(j) for all i ≤ j.
Proof By induction on t. The claim holds trivially for t = 1. Suppose t > 1 and the claim holds for all
t′ < t. Choose r(1) = p(1). Also, for each i > 1, define the line segment L˜i = {z ∈ L(i) : z ≥ p(1)}.
Observe that (1) L˜(i) ⊆ L(i), and (2) q(i) ∈ L˜(i) which implies L˜(i) 6= ∅. Moreover q(i) is an endpoint
of L˜(i) (by the assumption that q(i) ≥ p(1)). That is, L˜(i) = [p˜(i), q(i)] for some p˜(i). Note then that
p˜
(i)
A = max{p
(i)
A , p
(1)
A } and p˜
(i)
B = max{p
(i)
B , p
(1)
B }.
We now show that p˜(i) ≤ q(j) for all 2 ≤ i < j by considering the A and B coordinates separately.
Consider the A coordinate for each of the two possible cases: (1) p˜
(i)
A = p
(i)
A ≤ q
(j)
A by the assumption of
the claim; (2) p˜
(i)
A = p
(1)
A ≤ q
(j)
A by the definition of L˜
(i). The proof for the B coordinate is identical.
We can now apply the inductive hypothesis on the sequence of sub-intervals (L˜(2), . . . , L˜(t)) to obtain
a sequence of points (r(2), . . . , r(t)) satisfying r(i) ∈ L˜(i) for all i > 1 and r(i) ≤ r(j) for all 1 < i < j. Since
r(i) ∈ L˜(i), we also have r(1) ≤ r(i) for all i > 1. Thus, (r(1), . . . , r(t)) satisfies the required conditions for
the claim. ⊓⊔
Notice that the proof of Claim 1 is constructive, and the claimed sequence of points can be found
in polynomial time given the sequence of line segments. Our approach will be to argue that there is a
sequence of line segments, one for each a, b with a+ b = t, satisfying the conditions of Claim 1; we will
then invoke the claim to select the point corresponding to each entry M [a, b] with a+ b = t.
Recall that our construction of the DP table M is inductive: in order to construct a distribution over
allocation sequences for M [a, b], such that a+b = t, we will rely on the two distributions that correspond
to the entries M [a− 1, b] and M [a, b− 1]. Let v+A(a− 1, b) be defined as the pair (wA, wB) of expected
payoffs that results from sampling an allocation sequence from the entry M [a− 1, b] and appending an
‘A′ to it. We symmetrically define v+B(a, b− 1) for the pair of expected payoffs resulting from sampling
a distribution from entry M [a, b− 1] and appending a ‘B′.
For each (a, b) with a + b = t, we define the line segment Lc(a, b) = (v
+A(a − 1, b), v+B(a, b − 1)).
Note that this is the set of points (i.e., distributions) that can be implemented by randomizing between
the above two “appending policies”.
Next, we define the following two half-spaces: FA(a, b) = {z ∈ R2 : zA ≥ wA(a − 1, b)}, FB(a, b) =
{z ∈ R2 : zB ≥ wB(a, b− 1)}. We then let L(a, b) = Lc(a, b)∩FA(a, b)∩FB(a, b). Note that L(a, b) is the
set of points in Lc(a, b) that satisfy monotonicity conditions 1 and 2 in our theorem statement. We now
show that L(a, b) is non-empty; this will follow by induction from the fact that the entries of M with
total budget t− 1 satisfy the four conditions conditions of the theorem.
Lemma 1 L(a, b) 6= ∅
Proof We begin with the following notation and observations:
1. Let ℓ1 = (x1, y1) = (w
A(a, b− 1), wB(a, b− 1)), and ℓ2 = (x2, y2) = (wA(a− 1, b), wB(a− 1, b)). That
is, ℓ1 and ℓ2 are the points associated with M [a, b− 1] and M [a− 1, b]. By the inductive hypothesis
at a+ b− 1 = t− 1, cross monotonicity implies x1 ≥ x2 and y1 ≤ y2.
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2. Let p1 = w
A(a, b − 1) − v+B(a, b − 1)A, and q1 = v+B(a, b − 1)B − wB(a, b − 1). That is, p1 (resp.
q1) is the loss in welfare to player A (resp. the gain in welfare to Player B) when we add a node
to B’s allocation starting from an allocation drawn from M [a, b − 1]. Note that p1 ≤ q1 due to the
monotonicity of the social welfare function.
3. Similarly, p2 = v
+A(a − 1, b)A − w
A(a − 1, b), q2 = w
B(a − 1, b)− v+A(a − 1, b)B. That is, p2 (resp.
q2) is the gain in A’s welfare (resp. loss in B’s welfare) upon adding another node to A
′s allocation
starting from an allocation drawn from M [a− 1, b]. It follows again that p2 ≥ q2.
Given this notation, Lemma 1 is implied by the following claim applied to ℓ1, ℓ2, p1, q1, p2, q2 as defined
above.
Claim 2 Consider two points ℓ1 = (x1, y1), ℓ2 = (x2, y2) ∈ R2 such that x1 ≥ x2 and y1 ≤ y2. Let
e1 = (x1 − p1, y1 + q1), e2 = (x2 + p2, y2 − q2) ∈ R
2 such that 0 ≤ p1 ≤ q1 and p2 ≥ q2 ≥ 0. Then there
exists a sub-interval of the line-segment [e1, e2] that is contained in the region D+ = {(x, y) ∈ R2+ : x ≥
x1 and y ≥ y2}.
Proof By translating the line [ℓ1, ℓ2] (maintaining the same slope), we can assume without loss of gener-
ality that x1 = 0, y2 = 0 and x2, y1 ≥ 0, so that D+ = R2≥0.
First, if either e1 or e2 are in R
2
≥0, the claim is trivial, so we assume that e1, e2 /∈ R
2
≥0, implying that
x < p1 and y < q2.
Consider a point e′ on the line segment [e1, e2], given by a convex combination e
′ = α ·e1+(1−α) ·e2,
for α ∈ [0, 1]. Having e′ ∈ R2≥0 is equivalent to the following two conditions:
α(x− p1) + (1− α)p2 ≥ 0 (2)
αq1 + (1− α)(y − q2) ≥ 0 (3)
Using our assumption that x < p1, the first inequality gives
α ≤
p2
p1 + p2 − x
whereas the second inequality gives (using our assumption that y < q2):
α ≥
q2 − y
q1 + q2 − y
Let u = (q2 − y)/(q1 + q2 − y), v = p2/(p1 + p2 − x). Note that u, v ∈ [0, 1]. Proving that u ≤ v will
conclude the claim as that determines the range u ≤ α ≤ v defining the required sub-interval. First, we
have that
u ≤
p2 − y
q1 + p2 − y
≤
p2
q1 + p2
where the first inequality follows from our assumption that p2 ≥ q2. Second, our assumption that p1 ≤ q1
implies that
v ≥
p2
q1 + p2 − x
≥
p2
q1 + p2
where the last inequality follows again by our assumption that x < p1(≤ q1). This shows that u ≤ v,
thereby concluding the proof. ⊓⊔
Write p(a, b) for the endpoint of L(a, b) that is closer to v+A(a − 1, b), and q(a, b) for the endpoint
closer to v+B(a, b − 1). Consider the sequence of line segments (L(t, 0), L(t− 1, 1), . . . , L(0, t)) (i.e., the
intervals corresponding to the t’th diagonal). To complete the proof of Lemma 1, it remains to show
how to pick solutions from each of these intervals in a way that maintains the two cross-monotonicity
constraints.
It’s enough to show that
p(t− i, i)A ≥ q(t− j, j)A
and
p(t− i, i)B ≤ q(t− j, j)B
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for all i < j, since then Claim 1 tells us how to choose a point from each line segment such that all of our
cross-monotonicity properties are satisfied. Notice that the first inequality goes in the opposite direction
than would be implied by p(t− i, i) ≤ q(t− j, j). However, we can still apply Claim 1 due to symmetry
and the independence of the two axes. That is, we can reflect the line segments in the A axis so that
(p, q) becomes (−p, q), apply Claim 1 to obtain the points on each line, and then reflect back in the A
axis to obtain the required points.
Let us prove the inequality on the first entry (A’s utility). Note that p(t− i, i)A ≥ wA(t− i−1, i) from
the definition of v+A(a−1, b) and the intersecting half-space FA(a, b). Furthermore, for all j > i, we have
q(t− j, j)A ≤ wA(t− j, j − 1). Indeed, if q(t− j, j) = v+B(t− j, j − 1), then the inequality follows from
the definition of v+B(a, b − 1) and adverse competition. Otherwise (q 6= v+B(t − j, j − 1)), the manner
of the selection of q(t− j, j) implies that v+B(t− j, j − 1)A < wA(t− j− 1, j), and so by the intersection
with FA(a, b), we know that q(t− j, j) = w
A(t− j − 1, j) ≤ wA(t− j, j − 1) (by cross-monotonicity for
t− 1). Since j > i, we then have
p(t− i, i)A ≥ w
A(t− i− 1, i) ≥ wA(t− j, j − 1) ≥ q(t− j, j)A
where the second inequality follows from cross-monotonicity (applied j − i times) for budgets summing
to t− 1.
The argument for the second coordinate is identical. We can now apply Claim 1 to choose points from
each of the line segments that respect cross-monotonicity. Those will be the points we use to populate
the M matrix on the diagonal corresponding to total budget t. We have thus shown that table M can
be filled with distributions that satisfy conditions 1-4 of Theorem 1.
It remains to discuss the complexity of computing the entries of M . To this point we have not
bounded the size of our distributions’ supports. We will modify the argument to show that the number
of permutations required for each table entry M [a, b] can be limited to only three, by induction on t.
Consider the distribution constructed for M [a, b]. The support of this distribution has size at most
6: the three permutations in the support of M [a− 1, b] with A appended, plus the three permutations in
the support of M [a, b − 1] with B appended. Each of these six permutations implies an allocation, say
(S1, T1), . . . , (S6, T6). For each allocation, we consider the two-dimensional point (fA(Si, Ti), fB(Si, Ti))
representing the welfare to A and B for the given allocation. We can interpret our construction ofM [a, b]
as implementing a point (wA(a, b), wB(a, b)) with certain properties, such that this point lies in the
convex hull of the six points (fA(S1, T1), fB(S1, T1)), . . . , (fA(S6, T6), fB(S6, T6)).
We now use the following well-known theorem [23]:
Theorem 2 (Carathodory) Given a set V ⊂ Rn and a point p ∈ ConvV — the convex hull of V ,
there exists a subset A ⊂ V such that |A| ≤ n+ 1 and p ∈ ConvA.
It must therefore be that our point (wA(a, b), wB(a, b)) lies in the convex hull of at most three of the
points (fA(S1, T1),
fB(S1, T1)), . . . , (fA(S6, T6), fB(S6, T6)). It follows that there exists a distribution with a support that
consists of three of the six permutations corresponding to (a, b). Finding this distribution can be done
in constant time by considering
(
6
3
)
sets of three allocations.8 We can therefore construct M [a, b] as a
distribution over at most 3 permutations, concluding the proof of Theorem 1.
⊓⊔
The proof of Theorem 1 is constructive: it implies a recursive method for constructing the table M
of distributions. That is, the procedure ConstructDistributions from Algorithm 1 (with input (a, b)) will
procede by filling table M in increasing order of t, up to a+ b, by choosing the value of α for each table
entry as in the proof of Theorem 1, then storing the implied distribution over three permutations. Note
that we can explicitly store the allocations corresponding to the permutations in the table. We conclude,
given this implementation of ConstructDistributions, that Algorithm 1 is a polytime strategyproof 2-
approximation to the 2-player influence maximization problem.
8 Note that all quantities in this geometric problem are rational numbers, which are constructed via the sequence of
operations described in the proof above and therefore have polynomial bit complexity. We can therefore solve the convex
hull tasks described in this operation in polynomial time.
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5 A Strategyproof Mechanism for Three or More Players
To construct a strategyproof mechanism for k > 2 players, we will impose additional restrictions on the
influence functions f1, . . . , fk. These additional assumptions are satisfied by many models of influence
spread considered in the literature, as we discuss below. We show that, under these assumptions, there is
a natural mechanism that is strategyproof when there are at least three players. In fact, it turns out that
having three or more players in such a setting allows for a much simpler mechanism than the mechanism
for the case of only two players9.
Assumption 1: Mechanism Indifference We will assume that f(S) = f(S′) whenever the sets
⋃
i Si and⋃
i S
′
i are equal
10. That is, social welfare does not depend on the manner in which allocated items are
partitioned between the agents. We will call this the Mechanism Indifference (MeI) assumption.
If assumption 1 holds, then we can imagine a greedy algorithm that chooses which items to add to
the set
⋃
i Si one at a time to greedily maximize the social welfare. By assumption 1, the welfare does
not depend on how these items are divided among the players. This greedy algorithm generates a certain
social welfare whenever the sum of budgets is t; write w(t) for this welfare. Note that w(0), w(1), . . . is
a concave non-decreasing sequence.
Assumption 2: Agent Indifference We will assume that fi(Si,S−i) = fi(Si,S
′
−i) whenever sets
⋃
j 6=i Sj
and
⋃
j 6=i S
′
j are equal. That is, each agent’s utility depends on the set of items allocated to the other
players, but not on how the items are partitioned among those players. We will call this the Agent
Indifference (AgI) assumption. Notice that in the two-players case, this assumption is essentially vacuous.
We note that the models for competitive influence spread proposed by Carnes et al. [10] and Bharathi
et al. [11] are based on a cascade model of influence spread, and satisfy both the MeI and AgI assumptions.
Similarly, if we restrict the OR model in [12] so that the underlying spread process is a cascade (and
not a threshold) process and agents are anonymous (a restriction that will be defined in Section 6), as
assumed in the Carnes et al models, then this special case of the OR model also satisfies MeI and AgI.
5.1 The uniform random greedy mechanism
Consider Algorithm 2, which we refer to as the uniform random greedy mechanism. This mechanism
proceeds by first greedily selecting which subset of the ground set elements to allocate. It then chooses
an ordering of the players’ bids uniformly at random from the set of all possible orderings, then assigns the
selected elements to the players in this randomly chosen order. Note that this always results in a disjoint
allocation. The MeI assumption implies that the random greedy mechanism obtains a constant factor
approximation to the optimal social welfare. We now claim that, under the MeI and AgI assumptions,
this mechanism is strategyproof as long as there are at least 3 players.
Theorem 3 If there are k ≥ 3 players and the AgI and MeI assumptions hold, then Algorithm 2 is a
strategyproof mechanism. Furthermore, Algorithm 2 approximates the social welfare to within a factor of
e
e−1 from the optimum.
Proof As before, notice that lines 2–5 are an implementation of the standard greedy algorithm for maxi-
mizing a non-decreasing, submodular set-function subject to a uniform matroid constraint, as described
in [22,16], and hence gives the specified approximation ratio.
Next, we show that Algorithm 2 is strategyproof. Fix bid profile b and let t =
∑
i bi. Let I be the
union of all allocations made by Algorithm 2 on bid profile b; note that I depends only on t. Furthermore,
each agent i will be allocated a uniformly random subset of I of size bi. Thus, the expected utility of
agent i can be expressed as a function of bi and t. We can therefore write w
i(b, t) for the expected utility
9 At this point, the reader may wonder if the two player case can be reduced to the case k > 2 by adding dummy agents
with budget 0. This does not work because strategyproofness is defined over the space of all possible agent bids, so we
cannot restrict our attention only to profiles in which some players bid 0. Our examples in Appendix 3 show that this is
not just a nuance of the proof but rather an intrinsic obstacle to using the uniform distribution.
10 We again postpone discussion of multiset allocations until Appendix A
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Algorithm 2: Uniform Random Greedy Mechanism
Input: Ground set U = {e1, . . . , em}, budget profile b
Output: An allocation profile S
1 Initialize: Si ← ∅, i← 0, j ← 0, I ← ∅, t←
∑
i bi;
/* Choose elements to assign. */
2 while i < t do
3 ui ← argmaxc∈U{f(I ∪ {c})− f(I)} ;
4 I ← I ∪ {ui} ; i← i+ 1 ;
5 end
/* Partition elements of I. */
6 Γ ← {β : [t]→ [k] s.t. |β−1(i)| = bi for all i} ;
7 Choose β ∈ Γ uniformly at random ;
8 while j < t do
9 Sβ(j) ← Sβ(j) ∪ {uj} ;
10 j ← j + 1 ;
11 end
of agent i when bi = b and
∑
j bj = t (recall that we let w(t) denote the total social welfare when∑
i bi = t).
We now claim that wi(b, t) = b
t
w(t) for all i and all 0 ≤ b ≤ t. Note that this implies the desired
result, since if our claim is true then for all i and all 0 ≤ b ≤ t we will have
wi(b, t) =
b
t
w(t) ≤
b+ 1
t+ 1
w(t + 1) = wi(b + 1, t+ 1)
which implies the required monotonicity condition.
It now remains to prove the claim. The adverse competition assumption implies that wi(0, t) ≤
wi(0, 0) = 0 for all i and t. We next show that wi(1, t) = wj(1, t) for all i, j, and t ≥ 1. If t = 1 then this
follows from the MeI assumption. So take t ≥ 2 and pick any three agents i, j, and ℓ. Then, by the AgI
assumption, we have
wi(1, t) = w(t) − wℓ(t− 1, t) = wj(1, t).
We next show that wi(b, t) = wi(1, t) + wi(b − 1, t) for all i, all b ≥ 2, and all t ≥ b. Pick any three
agents i, j, and ℓ, any b ≥ 2, and any t ≥ b. Then, by the AgI assumption,
wi(b, t) = w(t) − wℓ(t− b, t)
= w(t) − [w(t)− wi(b− 1, t)− wj(1, t)]
= wi(b − 1, t) + wj(1, t)
= wi(b − 1, t) + wi(1, t).
It then follows by simple induction that wi(b, t) = bwi(1, t) for all 1 ≤ b ≤ t. But now note that
w(t) = wi(1, t) + wj(t − 1, t) = twi(1, t), and hence wi(1, t) = 1
t
w(t) and therefore wi(b, t) = b
t
w(t) for
all 0 ≤ b ≤ t, as required.
Note that the proof of Theorem 3 makes crucial use of the fact that there are at least three players.
Indeed, in Appendix B we give an example satisfing the MeI and AgI assumptions for which the random
greedy algorithm is not strategyproof for two players.
6 Disjoint Allocations
One feature of the mechanism from Section 4 for 2 players is that it does not necessarily return a profile
of disjoint allocations. That is, the algorithm may allocate a given element to both agents. Disjointness
is a natural property to require in many models of influence in social networks. Note that the mechanism
from Section 5 always returns disjoint allocations.
We now show how to modify the mechanism from Section 4 to ensure disjoint allocations. Recall that
our general strategy in the non-disjoint case was to use the locally greedy algorithm and construct a
strategyproof-inducing distribution over player orderings for that algorithm. Our strategy for achieving
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disjointness will be to modify the underlying greedy algorithm so that it only returns disjoint allocations,
then apply the same techniques as in Section 4 to convert this algorithm into a strategyproof mechanism.
As noted in Section 4, our method can be applied to any myopic allocation with a social welfare guarantee
that does not depend on the chosen order of players. It therefore suffices to find such a myopic allocation
method that guarantees disjointness.
When the disjointness constraint is combined with demand restrictions, the set of valid allocations
is not a matroid but rather an intersection of two matroids. The locally greedy algorithm described
in Section 2 is therefore not guaranteed to obtain a constant approximation for every ordering of the
players. For example, suppose the ground set U consists of two items, 1 and 2. Suppose player A has
values 1 and 1 + ǫ for items 1 and 2, respectively (where ǫ > 0 is arbitrarily small), and player B has
values 1 and N for items 1 and 2, respectively (where N > 1 is arbitrarily large). When the demands of
the two players are 1, the locally greedy algorithm might allocate to either player first, but if it allocates
to player A first then it obtains the unbounded approximation ratio N+12+ǫ .
The above problem stems from the asymmetry in the valuations of the two players. To address
this issue, we introduce a notion of player anonymity that captures those circumstances in which these
problems do not occur.
Definition 1 We say agents are anonymous if their valuations are symmetric; that is,
fi(S1, . . . , Sk) = fπ(i)(Sπ(1), . . . , Sπ(k)) for all permutations π and all agents 1 ≤ i ≤ k.
If players are anonymous then the social welfare satisfies f(S1, . . . , Sk) = f(Sπ(1), . . . , Sπ(k)) for all
permutations π. We note that the influence models proposed by Carnes et al. [10] and Bharathi et al. [11]
satisfy this condition. At the end of this section we will discuss the relationship between the anonymity
condition and the Agent Indifference and Mechanism Indifference conditions from Section 5.
What we now show is that when the players are anonymous, our order-independent locally greedy
algorithm from Section 2 obtains a strategyproof mechanism with a (k + 1)-approximation to the opti-
mal social welfare, if the given permutation over orderings of the player allocations is sampled from a
truthfulness-inducing distribution over permutations (e.g. the distributions we have obtained in the case
of two players). Hence, this method provides a transformation to the disjoint allocations case, if one were
to obtain a distribution over permutations for the non-disjoint case.
Algorithm 3 is a simple modification to Algorithm 1, in which we explicitly enforce disjointness of
the allocations.
Algorithm 3: Disjoint Locally Greedy algorithm
Input: Ground set U = {e1, . . . , . . . , en}, demands a, b for players 1, . . . , k, a valid permutation
π : {1, 2, . . . , t} → {1, 2, . . . , k} where t =
∑k
i=1 bi
Output: An allocation I1, . . . , Ik ⊆ U for the k players
1 for j = 1 . . . k do
2 Ij = ∅
3 end
4 for i = 1 . . . b1 + . . .+ bk do
5 u← argmaxc∈U−
⋃
Ij
{w(Iπ(i) ∪ {c}, I−i)− w(Iπ(i), I−i)} ;
6 Iπ(i) ← Iπ(i) ∪ {u} ;
7 end
Theorem 4 For any permutation (of player allocation turns) π : {1, 2, . . . , t} → {1, 2, . . . , k} where
t =
∑k
i=1 bi, Algorithm 3 obtains (k + 1)-approximation to the optimal social welfare obtainable for
disjoint allocation for identical players 1, . . . , k.
Proof Let O = (O1, . . . , Ok) be an optimal allocation. Let (I1, . . . , Ik) be the allocation obtained by
running Algorithm 3 for some permutation π. Partition O as follows. For each player i, set Oji = Oi ∩ Ij
for all j 6= i, and let O0i = Oi −
⋃
j 6=i Ij . By submodularity,
w(O1, . . . , Ok) ≤ w(O
0
1 , . . . , O
0
k) +
k−1∑
i=1
w(O
(1+i)modk
1 , . . . , O
(k+i)modk
k ). (4)
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Due to anonymity and the fact that Oji ⊆ Ij , for all j ∈ [k] we get
k−1∑
i=1
w(O
(1+i)modk
1 , . . . , O
(k+i)modk
k ) ≤ (k − 1) · w(I1, . . . , Ik). (5)
Next, we can apply the analysis performed for the original locally greedy algorithm, so as to obtain
the relation specified in the following lemma
Lemma 2 w(O01 , . . . , O
0
k) ≤ 2 · w(I1, . . . , Ik).
For readability, we prove the lemma at the end of this section. Now, combining relations (4) and (5) and
applying Lemma 2, we get:
w(O1, . . . , Ok) ≤ 2 · w(I1, . . . , Ik) + (k − 1)w(I1, . . . , Ik) = (k + 1) · w(I1, . . . , Ik) (6)
Corollary 1 For k = 2 players, there exists a 3-approximate strategyproof mechanism that achieves
disjoint allocations.
Proof Observe that this revised version of the locally greedy algorithm is order-independent. That is, we
obtain the same (constant) bound on its approximation ratio for any player ordering. In particular, this
means that we can apply the mechanism described in Section 4 for obtaining a strategyproof solution
without significantly degrading the approximation ratio of the greedy algorithm.
We note that for all k there is a natural greedy algorithm for this problem (with disjointness) that
obtains a 3-approximation for any k. Namely, the greedy algorithm that chooses both the player and the
allocation that maximizes the marginal utility on each iteration [9]). However, this algorithm imposes a
particular ordering on the allocations and therefore does not allow the degree of freedom required by our
truthful mechanism construction.
Proof (Proof of Lemma 2) We now adapt the analysis of the locally greedy algorithm (e.g. [16]) in order
to prove the bound in Lemma 2. We begin by introducing some additional notation. First, for i ∈ [k],
let O′i = O
0
i \ Ii. For an item e ∈ Ii (i ∈ [k]), S
e = (Se1 , . . . , S
e
k) denotes the partial solution of the
algorithm at the time of item e’s addition. For an allocation (A1, . . . , Ak) ⊆ Uk and an item e ∈ U ,
define the marginal gain to be ρie(A1, . . . , Ak) = w(A1, . . . , Ai∪{e}, . . . , Ak)−w(A1, . . . , . . . , Ak). Lastly,
for i ∈ [k], we let ei = argmine∈Ii ρ
i
e(S
e); i.e. the minimal marginal increase to social welfare, obtained
by the algorithm, when adding an element to Ii. The following lemma follows from the fact that the
social welfare is a non-decreasing, submodular function:
Lemma 3 ([22])
w(O01 , . . . , Ok) ≤ w(I1, . . . , Ik) +
k∑
i=1
∑
e∈O′
i
ρie(I1, . . . , Ik)
Now, by the greedy rule of Algorithm 3, we have:
ρiei(S
e
i ) ≥ ρ
i
e(S
e
i ), for all i ∈ [k], and for all e ∈ U \ S
ei
i (7)
Additionally, using the submodularity of w(·), and the fact that for all i, j ∈ [k], Seij ⊆ Ij , we get:
w(O01 , . . . , O
0
k) ≤ w(I1, . . . , Ik) +
k∑
i=1
∑
e∈O′
i
ρie(I1, . . . , Ik)
≤ w(I1, . . . , Ik) +
k∑
i=1
∑
e∈O′
i
ρie(S
ei) (8)
Now, using (7), we further extend the above bound as follows
w(O01 , . . . , O
0
k) ≤ w(I1, . . . , Ik) +
k∑
i=1
∑
e∈O′
i
ρiei(S
ei)
= w(I1, . . . , Ik) +
∑
i=1
bi · ρ
i
ei
(Sei)
≤ w(I1, . . . , Ik) + w(I1, . . . , Ik) = 2 · w(I1, . . . , Ik) (9)
where the last inequality follows from the definition of the elements e1, . . . , ek.
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6.1 Relation to Indifference Conditions
In this section we explore the relationship between the anonymity condition required by Theorem 4 and
the mechanism and agent indifference conditions (MeI and AgI) used in Section 5. As we will show, these
conditions are incomparable when there are only two players, but when there are three or more players
the AgI and MeI conditions together are strictly stronger than the anonymity condition.
Consider first the case of two players. To see that MeI does not imply anonymity, consider the
following example with two objects {a, b} and two players. The functions f1 and f2 are given by f1(x, 0) =
f2(0, x) = 2 for any singleton x, f1({a, b}, 0) = f2(0, {ab}) = 3, and f1(x, y) = 1.6, f2(x, y) = 1.4 for
(x, y) = (a, b) or vice-versa. One can verify that f = f1+ f2 is submodular and that adverse competition
and mechanism indifference are satisfied, but it is not anonymous (since f1(x, y) 6= f2(y, x) for singletons
x and y).
To see that anonymity does not imply MeI, consider the following example with two objects {a, b} and
two players. We will have f1(x, 0) = f2(0, x) = 1 for each singleton x, f1({a, b}, 0) = f2(0, {a, b}) = 2,
but f1(x, y) = f2(x, y) = 3/4 for (x, y) = (a, b) or vice-versa. This pair of functions exhibits adverse
competition and its sum is submodular, but it does not satisfy MeI (since f(a, b) 6= f({a, b}, 0)).
For k ≥ 3 players, MeI and AgI together imply anonymity.
Theorem 5 If there are k ≥ 3 agents and the AgI and MeI conditions hold, then the agents are anony-
mous.
Proof We will assume k = 3 for notational convenience; extending to k > 3 is straightforward. It is
sufficient to show that f1(S, T, U) = f2(T, S, U) for arbitrary sets S, T, U ; symmetry with respect to all
other permutations then follows by composing transpositions.
We first show that f1(S, ∅, U) = f2(∅, S, U) for all sets S and U . By MeI, f(S, ∅, U) = f(∅, S, U).
By AgI, f3(S, ∅, U) = f3(∅, S, U). By our assumed normalization, f2(S, ∅, U) = f1(∅, S, U) = 0. Taking
sums, we conclude that f1(S, ∅, U) = f2(∅, S, U).
By the same argument, f1(S, ∅, U ∪T ) = f2(∅, S, U ∪T ). But then, by AgI, f1(S, T, U) = f1(S, ∅, U +
T ) = f2(∅, S, U + T ) = f2(T, S, U), as required.
Finally, we show that the MeI and AgI assumptions together are strictly stronger than anonymity for k ≥
3 players, as anonymity does not imply MeI. Consider the following example with 3 objects {a1, a2, a3}
and 3 players. For any labeling of the singletons as x, y, z, define f1(x, y, z) = 7/24, f1({x, y}, z, 0) =
f1({x, y}, 0, z) = 3/4, f1(x, {y, z}, 0) = f1(x, 0, {y, z}) = 1/4, and f1({x, y, z}, 0, 0) = 1. Define f2 and f3
symmetrically, so agents are anonymous. Adverse competition is satisfied and the sum of these functions
is submodular, but neither MeI nor AgI are satisfied.
7 Conclusions
We have presented a general framework for mechanisms that allocate items given an underlying submodu-
lar process. Although we have explicitly referred to spread processes over social networks, we only require
oracle access to the outcome values, and thus our methods apply to any similar settings which uphold
the properties we have required from the processes. We build on natural greedy algorithms to construct
efficient strategyproof mechanisms that guarantee constant approximations to the social welfare.
An important question is how to extend our results to the more general case of k > 2 agents without
the MeI and AgI assumptions. As discussed in Appendix D, it seems that a fundamentally new approach
would be required to obtain an O(1)-approximate strategyproof mechanism for k > 2 players. Another
natural and challenging extension would be to assume that nodes have costs for being initially allocated
and then replace the cardinality constraint on each agent by a knapsack constraint. To do so, the most
direct approach would be to try to utilize the known approximation for maximizing a non decreasing
submodular function subject to one [24] or multiple [25] knapsack constraints. These methods do not
seem to readily lend themselves to the approach we have been able to exploit in the case of cardinality
constraints. We have also assumed a “demand satisfaction” condition. Without this condition, it is trivial
to achieve a strategyproof k approximation by allocating all initial elements to the agent who can achieve
the most utlility. Can we improve upon this trivial approximation factor without imposing the MeI and
AgI assumptions.
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An important question is how to extend our results to the more general case of k players. As we
discuss in Appendix D, it seems that a fundamentally new approach would be required to obtain a
polytime strategyproof mechanism for k > 2 players.
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A Relation with Other Diffusion Models
In our results, we have made a number of modelling assumptions about agent utilities and social welfare. To some extent,
we can argue that these assumptions may be necessary to be able to obtain truthfulness and constant approximation on
the social welfare. Furthermore, we now provide some background on the relevance of our assumptions to the existing work
on influence diffusion in social networks, which served as the running example throughout the paper.
Non-decreasing and submodular utilities and social welfare To the best of our knowledge, in order to establish a
constant approximation on the social welfare, all of the known models in competitive and non-competitive diffusion assume
that the overall expected spread is a non-decreasing and submodular function with respect to the set of initial adopters. A
main part of the seminal work by Kempe et al. ([6]) is the proof that the expected spread of two models of non-competitive
diffusion process is indeed non-decreasing and submodular. This was later extended to more general processes in [7]. In
the case of the competitive influence spread models in [11], [10], and [12], it is shown that a player’s expected spread is a
non-decreasing and submodular function of his initial set of nodes, while fixing the competitors allocations of nodes. This
also implies that the total influence spread is a non-decreasing and submodular. Without any assumption on the nature of
the social welfare function, it is NP hard to obtain any non trivial approximation on the social welfare even for a single
player.
Adverse competition In the initial adoption of (say) a technology, a competitor can indirectly benefit from competition
so as to insure widespread adoption of the technology. However, once a technology is established (e.g., cell phone usage),
the issue of influence spread amongst competitors should satisfy adverse competition. The same can be said for selecting a
candidate in a political election. We also note that the previous competitive spread models ([11], [10], and [12]) mentioned
above also satisfy adverse competition. In its generality, the Goyal and Kearns model need not satisfy this assumption, but
in order to obtain their positive result on the price of anarchy, they adopt a similar restriction (namely, that the adoption
function at every node satisfies the condition that a player’s probability of influencing an adjacent node cannot decrease
in the absense of other players competing).
Furthermore, a simple example shows that the assumption of adverse competition is necessary for truthfulness. Consider
the following two-player setting. The ground set is composed of two items: u1, which contributes a value of 1 to the receiving
player and a value of N to her competitor (who did not receive u1), and item u2 which gives both players a value of 1. Now,
consider the outcome of any mechanism when the bid profile is (1, 1). Without loss of generality, one player, say player A,
will receive u1, while the other player will get u2. The valuations would therefore be 2 and N + 1 for players A and B,
respectively. In that case, player A would prefer to lower her bid to 0, which would guarantee her a valuation of N (player B
would have to get u1, as otherwise the approximation ratio of the social welfare is unbounded as N grows). We conclude that
unless the competition assumption holds, no strategyproof mechanism can, in general, obtain a bounded approximation
ratio to the optimal social welfare. Although the example refers to deterministic allocations, the same argument can be
made for randomized allocations.
Mechanism and agent indifference In both the Wave Propagation model and the Distance-Based model presented in
[10], the propagation of influence upholds both the mechanism and agent indifference properties. In [13], it is assumed that
the probability that a node will adopt some technology is a function of the fraction of influenced neighbours (regardless of
their assumed technology). This immediately implies mechanism indifference, as general spread is invariant with respect
to the distribution of technologies among initial nodes. For their positive price of anarchy results about more than two
players, it is assumed that the selection function is linear which would imply mechanism indifference.
Anonymity With the excption of the OR model ([12]), the above mentioned models also satisfy an anonymity assumption
that will be needed to modify the local greedy algorithm (as in Algorithms 1 and 2) so as to insure that the initial allocation
is disjoint (see Appendix 6). Anonymity basically means that the players are symmetric and when there are more than
two players this is a somewhat weaker condition than having both mechanism and agent indifference as we shall show in
Appendix 6. We note that in [11] and [10] there is only one edge-weight per edge 11 thereby enforcing anonymity. In [13],
it is explicitly stated that the selection function is symmetric across the players and this implies anonymity.
11 In fact, towards the end of the paper, the authors of [10] conjecture that their results extend to the non-anonymous
case where each edge has technology-specific weights. This conjecture was later shown to be false in [12].
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Multiset Allocations and Disjointness Our model assumes that each agent can be allocated a node at most once,
and indeed most influence models assume that a node is allocated at most once in any initial allocation. However, we can
extend our model to allow a node to be allocated multiple times to the same agent, as in (for example) the model of Goyal
and Kearns [13]. To implement such an extension, we can simply consider a modified problem instance with many identical
copies of a given node, treating each copy as a distinct element, and then proceed as though each element can be allocated
at most once. The output of Algorithm 1 for two players and Algorithm 2 for more than two players would then be a profile
of multisets with regard to the original network model. We note, however, that for the case of Algorithm 2, the MeI and
AgI definitions effectively imply that if multisets are permitted, then non-disjoint allocations must be permitted as well,
as the conditions cannot distinguish between an element being allocated to one agent twice or to two different agents.
Generality of the Model A few words are in order about the generality of the model of diffusion under which we
prove that Algorithm 1 is strategyproof and provides a 2-approximation. As noted, with the exception of the OR model,
the analysis in previous competitive influence models assumes anonymous agents. Our general model does not require
anonymity and hence we can accommodate agent specific edge weights (e.g. in determining the probability that influence
is spread across an edge, or for determining whether the weighted sum of influenced neighbors crosses a given threshold of
adoption). Our model also notably allows agent-independent node weights, for determining the value of an influenced node.
Moreover, our abstract model does not specify any particular influence spread process, so long as the social welfare function
is monotone submodular and each player’s payoff is monotonically non-decreasing in his own set and non-increasing in the
allocations to other players. In particular, our framework can be used to model probabilistic cascades as well as submodular
threshold models.
B Counter examples when there are two agents (extended discussion)
The locally greedy algorithm is defined over an arbitrary permutation of the allocation turns. At the core of our work, we
seek to carefully construct such orderings in a manner that induces strategyproofness. We demonstrate that this algorithm
due to Nemhauser et al [9] (see also Goundan and Schultz [16]) is not, in general, strategyproof for some natural methods
for choosing the ordering of the allocation between two agents.
To clarify the context when there are only two agents, we refer to them as agent A and agent B and their utilites as fA
and fB respectively. We give examples of a set U and functions fA and fB (satisfying the conditions of our model) such
that natural greedy algorithms for choosing sets S and T result in non-monotonicities. Our examples will all easily extend
to the case of k > 2 agents (but not satisfying agent indifference).
B.1 The OR model
We will consider examples of a special case of the OR model for influence spread, as studied in [12]. Let G = (V, E) be
a graph with fractional edge-weights p : E → [0, 1], vertex weights wv for each v ∈ V , and sets IA, IB ⊆ V of “initial
adopters” allocated to each player. We use vertex weights for clarity in our examples; in Appendix C we show how to
modify the examples given in this section to be unweighted. The process then unfolds in discrete steps. For each uA ∈ IA
and vA such that (uA, vA) ∈ E, uA, once infected, will have a single chance to “infect” vA with probability w(uA, vA).
Define the same, single-step process for the nodes in IB, and let OA and OB be the nodes infected by nodes in IA and IB,
respectively. Note that the infection process defined for each individual player is an instance of the Independent Cascade
model as studied by Kempe et al. [6]. Finally, nodes that are contained in OA\OB will be assigned to player A, nodes in
OB\OA will be assigned to B, and any nodes in OA∩OB will be assigned to one player or the other by flipping a fair coin.
In our examples, we consider two identical players each having utility equal to the weight of the final set of nodes
assigned by the spread process. It can be easily verified that both the expected social welfare (total weight of influenced
nodes) and the expected individual values (fixing the other player’s allocation) are submodular set-functions.
B.2 Deterministic greedy algorithms that are not strategyproof
We demonstrate that the more obvious deterministic orderings for the greedy algorithm fail. First, consider the “dictator-
ship” ordering, in which (without loss of generality by symmetry) player A is first allocated nodes according to his budget,
and only then player B is allocated nodes. Our example showing non-truthfulness also applies to an ordering that would
always select the player having the largest current unsatisfied budget breaking ties (again without loss of generality by
symmetry) in favor of player A. Consider the graph depicted in Figure 1a. When player A bids 1 and player B bids 1 as
well, the algorithm will allocate c1 to player A, as it contributes the maximal marginal gain to the social welfare, and will
allocate c3 to player B. The value of the allocation for player A is 2.
However, notice that if player A increases its bid to 2, the mechanism will allocate nodes c1 and c4 to player A, and
allocate c2 to B. In this case player A receives an extra value of
1
2
from node c3, but the allocation of c2 to B will “pollute”
player A’s value from c1: he will receive nodes u1 and u2 each with probability
1
10
+ 1
2
· 9
10
= 11
20
. Thus the total expected
value for player A is only 16
10
, and hence the algorithm is non-monotone in the bid of player A.
Next, consider the Round Robin ordering, in which the mechanism alternates between allocating a node to player A
and to player B. Our example here also applies to the case when the mechanism always chooses the player having the
smallest current unsatisfied budget breaking ties in favor of player A. Consider the instance given in Figure 1b. When
the bids of players A and B are 1 and 2, respectively, the algorithm will first allocate c1 to player A, and then it will
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(a) The counter-example for the deterministic mechanism
with a dictatorship ordering. The initial budget for both
players is 1.
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(b) The counter-example for the deterministic
algorithm under a Round Robin ordering. The
initial budgets for players A and B are 1 and 2,
respectively.
Figure 1: Counter-examples for the mechanism under the deterministic dictatorship and Round Robin
orderings. In both case, we set the weights wci = ǫ and wui = 1, for all 1 ≤ i ≤ 4. 0 < ǫ <
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Figure 2: The counterexample for the mechanism that allocated according to a random ordering of the
turns (0 < ǫ≪ 1). wci = ǫ, i = 1, . . . , 5, wui = 1, i = 1, 2
subsequently allocate nodes c3 and c4 to player B, which results in a payoff of 1 for player A. If player A were to increases
his bid to 2, then the mechanism would allocate nodes c1 and c4 to player A, and nodes c2 and c3 to player B, for a payoff
of 3 · ǫ + 2 · ǫ + (1 − 2 · ǫ) · 1
2
= 1
2
+ 4 · ǫ < 1 (since 0 < ǫ < 1
8
). Therefore, the monotonicity is violated for the payoff to
player A.
B.3 The uniform random greedy algorithm is not strategyproof
As we shall see in Section 5, for the case of k > 2 agents in the restricted setting that assumes mechanism and agent
indifference, a very simple mechanism admits a strategyproof mechanism that provides an e
e−1
approximation to the
optimal social welfare. More specifically, we show that under these assumptions on the social welfare agent utilities, taking
a uniformly random permutation over the allocation turns is a strategyproof algorithm. In contrast, for the case of k = 2,
and even with these additional restrictions (although the agent indifference assumption turns out to be vacuous in this
case), the uniformly random mechanism is not strategyproof.
Consider the example given in Figure 2. We note that for this example, Algorithm 2 in Section 5 is equivalent to
first choosing a random order of allocation (e.g. choosing all possible permutations satisfying agent demands with equal
probability) and then allocating greedily. The greedy algorithm will allocate one of c2, c3, c4 and c5 to one of the players,
then allocate c1, and then any remaining nodes.
Let player A’s budget be 3 and player B’s budget be 1. In this case, with probability 1
4
, player B will be allocated
c1 (i.e. when B’s allocation occurs second), in which case player A’s expected value would be 1. Also, with probability
3
4
,
player B will be allocated one of {c2, c3, c4, c5}, in which case player A’s expected outcome would be
1
2
+ ǫ. In total, player
A’s expected payoff will be 5
8
+ 3
4
ǫ.
If player A were to increase his budget to 4, then with probability 1
5
player B will be allocated c1, in which case player
A’s outcome will be 1. On the other hand, player A’s expected payoff will be 1
2
+ ǫ if B is allocated one of {c2, c3, c4, c5},
which occurs with probability 4
5
. In total, player A’s expected outcome will be 3
5
+ 4
5
ǫ < 5
8
+ 3
4
ǫ, implying that this algorithm
is non-monotone.
C Counterexamples with Unweighted Nodes
In Section 3 we constructed specific examples of influence spread instances for the OR model, to illustrate that simple
greedy methods are not necessarily strategyproof for the case of two players. These examples used weighted nodes which
our model allows. For the sake of completeness, we now show that these examples can be extended to the case of unweighted
nodes.
We focus on the example from Section B.3 to illustrate the idea; the other examples can be extended in a similar
fashion. In that example there were nodes u1 and u2 of weight 1, and nodes c1, . . . , c5 of weight 0. We modify the example
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as follows. We choose a sufficiently large integer N > 1 and a sufficiently small ǫ > 0. We will replace node u1 with a set
S of 2/ǫ independent nodes. We replace the ǫ-weighted edge from c1 to u1 with an ǫ-weighted edge from c1 to each node
in T .
Similarly, we replace u2 by a set T of N independent nodes. For each ci, we replace the unit-weight edge from ci to u2
with a unit weight edge from ci to each node in T .
In this example, if the sum of agent budgets is at most 5, the greedy algorithm will never allocate any nodes in S or
T . The allocation and analysis then proceeds just as in Section B.3, to demonstrate that if agent B declares 1 then agent
A would rather declare 3 than 4.
D Tightness of Approach: More than Two Players
The mechanism we construct in Section 4 is applicable to settings in which there are precisely two competing players, and
our mechanism in Section 5 for more than three players requires the MeI and AgI assumptions. A natural open question
is whether these results can be extended to the general case of three or more agents without the MeI and AgI restrictions.
In this section we briefly describe the difficulty in applying our approach to settings with three players.
For the case of two players in Section 4, our mechanism was built from an initial greedy algorithm by randomizing over
orderings under which to assign elements to players. Our construction is recursive: we demonstrated that if we can define
the behaviour of a strategyproof mechanism for all possible budget declarations up to a total of at most t, then we can
extend this to a strategyproof mechanism for all possible budget declarations that total at most t + 1. A key observation
that makes this extension possible is the direct relation between the utilities of the two players. This manifests itself in
the cross monotonicities that we utilize in the inductive argument. In addition, the strategyproofness condition (i.e. agent
monotonicity) can be equivalently re-expressed as a certain “budget competition” property: if one player increases his
budget, then the expected utility for the other player cannot increase by more than the marginal gain the total welfare.
In other words, for all a + b ≥ 1, a strategyproof mechanism must satisfy wA(a, b) − wA(a, b − 1) ≤ ∆⊕B(a, b) where
∆⊕B(a, b) = w(a, b) −w(a, b− 1) and a similar consequence with regard to ∆⊕A(a, b).
Claim 3 (Equivalence of monotonicity and budget competition for two players)
1: wA(a, b) −wA(a, b− 1) ≤ w(a, b) −w(a, b− 1) iff wB(a, b− 1) ≤ wB(a, b)
2: wB(a, b)− wB(a, b− 1) ≤ w(a, b) −w(a, b− 1) iff wA(a, b− 1) ≤ wA(a, b)
Proof We provide the proof for ∆⊕B(a, b).
wB(a, b− 1) ≤ wB(a, b) iff wA(a, b) +wB(a, b− 1) ≤ wA(a, b) + wB(a, b) iff
wA(a, b) + wB(a, b− 1) + wA(a, b− 1) ≤ wA(a, b) + wB(a, b) + wA(a, b− 1) iff
wA(a, b) + w(a, b− 1) ≤ w(a, b) +wA(a, b− 1) iff wA(a, b)− wA(a, b− 1) ≤ w(a, b)− w(a, b− 1) ⊓⊔
A direct extension of our approach to three players would involve proving inductively that an allocation rule that
satisfies these conditions for all budgets that total at most t can always be extended to handle budgets that total up to
t + 1. We now give an example to show that this is not the case, even when our underlying submodular function takes a
very simple linear form.
Suppose we have three players A, B, and C, and suppose our ground set U contains a single element g of value; all
other elements are worth nothing. The utility for each agent is 1 if their allocation contains g, otherwise their utility is 0. In
this case, the locally greedy algorithm simply gives element g to the first player that is chosen for allocation; the remaining
allocations have no effect on the utility of any player. Note then that the marginal gain in social welfare is 1 for the first
allocation, and 0 for all subsequent allocations made by the greedy algorithm.
We now define the behaviour of a mechanism for all budget declarations totalling at most 2. Note that the relevant
feature of this mechanism is the (possibly randomized) choice of which agent is first in the order presented to the greedy
algorithm. We present this behaviour in the following table.
Budgets (a, b, c) Player selected Utilities (wA, wB, wC)
(0, 0, 0) N/A (0, 0, 0)
(1, 0, 0) A (1, 0, 0)
(0, 1, 0) B (0, 1, 0)
(0, 0, 1) C (0, 0, 1)
(1, 1, 0) A (1, 0, 0)
(0, 1, 1) B (0, 1, 0)
(1, 0, 1) C (0, 0, 1)
We note that this mechanism (restricted to these type profiles) is strategyproof, satisfies the budget competition
property, and also satisfies the cross-monotonicity properties (i.e. in the invariants of Theorem 1). However, we claim that
no allocation on input (1, 1, 1) that obtains positive social welfare can maintain the budget competition property. To see
this, note that the budget competition property would imply that wA(1, 1, 1) ≤ wA(1, 0, 1)+∆⊕B(1, 1, 1) = wA(1, 0, 1) = 0.
Similarly, we must have wB(1, 1, 1) = wC(1, 1, 1) = 0. Thus, in order to maintain the budget competition property, our
mechanism would have to generate social welfare 0 on input (1, 1, 1), resulting in an unbounded approximation factor.
We conclude that there is no way to extend this specific mechanism for budgets totalling at most 2 to a (strategyproof)
mechanism for budgets totalling at most 3 while maintaining the constant approximation factor of the locally greedy
algorithm.
Roughly speaking, the problem illustrated by this example is that the presence of more than two bidders means that
a substantial increase in the utility gained by one player does not necessarily imply any limits in the utility of another
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specific player. This is in contrast to the case of two players, in which the utilities of the two players are more directly
related. This fundamental difference seems to indicate that substantially different techniques will be required in order to
construct strategyproof mechanisms with three or more players.
A different (and natural) approach would be to employ the solution for two players by grouping all but one player
at a time, and running the mechanism for two players recursively. However, this method seems ineffective in our setting,
as interdependencies between the players’ outcomes can introduce non-monotonicities. This brings into question whether
or not the locally greedy method can be made strategyproof by some method of randomizing over the order in which
allocations are made.
This “2 vs 3 barrier” is, of course, not unique to our problem. Many optimization problems (such as graph coloring)
are easily solvable when the size parameter is k = 2 but become NP-hard when k ≥ 3. Closer to our setting, the 2 vs 3
barrier has been discussed in recent papers concerning mechanism design without payments, such as in the Lu et al. [27]
results for k-facility location. Additionally Ashlagi et al. discussed similar issues ([28]) in the context of mechanisms for
kidney exchange. They show that for n points on the line, there is a deterministic (respectively, randomized) strategyproof
mechanism for placing k = 2 facilities (so as to minimize the sum of distances to the nearest facility) with approximation
ratio n − 2 (respectively, 4) whereas for k = 3 facilities, they do not know if there is any bounded ratio for deterministic
strategyproof mechanisms and the best known approximation for randomized strategyproof mechanisms is O(n).
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